Ideation and Photography: A critique of François Laruelle’s concept of abstraction by Roberts, John






In the Concept of Non-Photography (2011), François Laruelle outlines an ambitious 
bid for a theory of photography that jettisons what he calls the “ontological 
distinctions and aesthetics notions”
1
 of the Humanities; in other words, a theory of 
photography that demotes the interpretative and technical categories that hitherto have 
laid claim to photography’s singular realism, or world-disclosing capacities. This 
expulsion of photography’s normative “appeal to the World, to the perceived object”
2
 
is to be pursued, not unsurprisingly through an intellectual withdrawal from the 
organizational character of the social particulars, genres, styles and historicity of the 
photograph. This is why Laruelle is so insistent on the need for theory of photography 
that defies what he terms - familiar from his non-philosophy more generally - a 
decisionist (or subjectivist) interpretation of the photograph’s manifest content - what 
he calls an abstract theory of photography. Standard photographic theory accumulates 
stories and multiple historical truths and as such registers the quality and range of 
photographic affects, an abstract theory of photography, on the other hand, dispenses 
with them. Abstraction, then, in classically scientific terms is a subtractive move - an 
axiomatic and reductive operation - rather than a hermeneutic exercise. But this move 
is not built out of a new language of photographic form. By abstraction Laruelle does 
not mean the creation of a photographic theory that interrogates the immanent spatial 
relations of the photograph, as opposed to the semiotic analysis of scene or setting as 
a focus for the presence or absence of human activity, or that draws out the 
insignificant or overlooked detail (as in Salvador Dali and Roland Barthes) as a means 
of defamiliarizing the photography’s manifest content. There is no recourse to the 
‘abstractedness’ of the internal relations of photography, or nothing of this sort that 
would turn his concept of abstraction into a new version of formalism. Furthermore, 
his understanding of abstraction has nothing in common with the production and 
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reception of photography under the law of real abstraction (photography’s commodity 
form), or the notion of real abstraction as source of photographic truth (as in 
photography’s reliance since the 1960s [Ed Ruscha] on repetition and the sequence as 
a metonym of ‘reified vision’). Nor has his theory anything to do with photography’s 
relationship to social abstraction as the correlative of real abstraction or the value 
form (the socially heteronomous outcomes of capitalist competition on the material 
world, or what Henri Lefebvre called “representations of space”
3
: the production and 
reproduction of the built environment), in photography’s capacity for the panoramic 
bird’s eye view. Rather, for Laruelle, abstraction is what happens to photography 
when thinking about photography discards the mechanics of photographic 
interpretation as such – its “realist illusion,”
4
 its “already made ‘interpretative 
frameworks’ ”
5
- to concentrate on photography as a specific order of the scientific, 
what he calls its infinite field of materialities: a “manifold of determinations without 
synthesis.”
6
 That is, photography is not a support for something else, something to be 
explained or narrativised on the basis of its manifest content, but an “unlimited 
theoretical space.”
7
 Or, as Ray Brassier explains in an early, relatively sympathetic, 
account of Laruelle’s non-philosophy: “the possibilities of philosophical invention, 





In this respect Laruelle follows, in a standard way, what other philosophers and 
theorists of photographic representation from Charles Sanders Peirce onwards have 
necessarily foregrounded – What is photography’s relationship to the real? Why does 
photography continually recall us to the problem of the real? But for Laruelle, 
dramatically, this is pursued without any attachment to what has usually defined all 
schools – realist and anti-realist alike - within this tradition: namely photography’s 
particular and vivid worldliness or social embeddedness. Thus if realists, and anti-
realist differ on the conventionality or non-conventionality of the interrelationship 
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between index and icon, they at least both necessarily recognize that photographs 
establish a definite social-relational encounter with the world. Even Umberto Eco in 
his defense of the photograph as an autonomous symbol recognizes this.
9
 Laruelle, 
however, pursues a conventionalist anti-realism and anti-Peircian position on the 
index/icon interface to the point where the photograph becomes absolute and pure 
idea. Indeed, abstraction is another word for the photograph’s ideational distance 
from its depicted objects. “A photo manifests a distance of an infinite order or 
inequality to the World,”
10
 rendering things as “inert and sterile” before they appear.
11
 
“Photography allow one to see what a thing that is photographed resembles: the photo 
is only ever the photo of that which it appears to be the photo.”
12
 In other words, 
Laruelle, wants an abstract theory of photography that brackets the idea of 
photography as a possible mimetic Doubling of the World.  Photographs for Laruelle 
are definable not through what they represent – their perceivable objects - but what 
they represent as a photographic act or force itself – a vision force - and as such are 
absolutely distinguishable from their extra-representational objects. He talks of 
photographs as being apparitional in this sense. Thus for all photo-theory’s 
commonplace talk of photo-realism, photographs in fact, do not share a common 
space of objectification with perception at all; represented objects in photographs are 
one thing, their objective referents another. This is why he insists it is more 
appropriate to talk of photographs resembling other photographs than it is of 
photographs resembling their depicted objects. Indeed, contrary, to the research-
scientific, legal and social uses of photography, photography has never been or can 
ever be an objective aid to perception.  
 
Unsurprisingly, then, abstraction is a transcendentalizing process that runs in parallel 
with the world, as opposed to being in intimate association with it (in the Hegelian 
and dialectical sense), and as such, is a mode of appearing that is wholly exterior to 
appearances as a source of knowledge. In the photograph: “There are only pure 
‘phenomena’, with no in-itself hidden behind them”;
13
 the photograph is a “pure 
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irreflective manifestation of the phenomenon-without-logos.”
14
 A strange disjunction 
emerges then. On the one hand photography invites an “unlimited theoretical” 
production, but on the other hand, it resists as a condition of its essence – what 
Laruelle calls the photograph’s ‘literalness’ or reproduction of the real-as-Identity - 
any social and discursive encounter with its depicted objects. This is perhaps why 
abstraction takes on a heightened figural character for Laruelle, as opposed to it 
possessing any kind of socially productive identity:  in creating this flattened and 
parallel universe all photographs (not just staged or digitally composite ones), are an 
“absolute fiction.”
15
 Indeed, absolute fiction becomes the name precisely for 
Laruelle’s notion of theoretical speculation. Photographs lose their socially 
determined, causal-historic-genealogical identity – their identity as concrete 
abstractions derived from appearances - to become things operating transcendentally 
at the limits of thought, that is, irreducible to representation and causation. This 
dissociation of the photograph from its depicted objects and conditions of production 
is hardly novel within conventionalism. Post-Kantian realists and idealists of course 
have long attacked the false conflation between resemblance and truth: but why, here, 
the irreal inversion of photography under the heading of abstraction? Why the 
absolute dismantling of indexicality and mimesis, and the reification of the 
photograph-as-symbol, in the name of abstraction? Why do photography and photo-
theory need to become this peculiar parallel vision-force?  
 
Laruelle’s critique of decisionism more broadly is predicated upon on what we might 
call a fear of philosophical propinquity or subjective intimacy. If Peter Sloterdijk has 
denigrated Western philosophy as a tragic history of epoché and ascetic 
contemplation, of maddening distance,
16
 Laruelle sees it, from the opposite 
perspective as a febrile and maddening entanglement of the philosophical subject with 
its objects.
17
 Western Philosophy or Greco-Occidental thought is always damagingly 
caught up with the arbitrary judgements and circularity of ‘doublet-thinking’: the 
endless passage back and forth from one contrary to another.  Even deconstructionism 
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cannot escape this: as soon as the bifucatory logic is dismantled through the 
introduction of a suspensive third term, the circularity of meaning is restored at a 
higher level, a mere “softening”
18
 of the would-be perils of decisionism. Laruelle’s 
post-metaphysical, post-dialectical, non-Differencing solution, then, is bracingly 
simple, if technically convoluted:  a kind of non-subjectivist halting to philosophical 
scission and aporetic scrupulousness, in order to situate thinking at the border 
between the universalizing ambitions of philosophical conceptualization and the 
axiomatic demands of science. But this is not an invitation to let science to take over 
the reins of philosophy. On the contrary, if philosophy for Laruelle needs to renew its 
vows with science – in order to clear out all the epistemological machinery of 
interpretation and Western philosophy’s decisionist intimacy with its objects – these 
vows do not in turn produce a new unified scientized philosophy. If philosophy needs 
science, this new science (of philosophy-as-science) refuses to forfeit philosophy’s 
special claims on the speculative. This is why Laruelle’s abstract theory of 
photography does not actually set out to explain photography scientifically – give it 
an ontology, or provide a topology of its effects or a taxonomy of its attributes – but 
rather, render it generically available for “unlimited theoretical” production.  
 
In an article on Laruelle’s speculative methodology, Andrew McGettigan has called 
Laruelle pejoratively a philosopher as strong poet (in Richard Rorty’s sense), in which 
frustratingly the philosopher’s ‘intuition’ does the philosophical work, separate from 
any adequate historical and theoretically account of his objects of critique.
19
 There is 
some truth in this, but Laruelle’s commitment to a kind of a Gnostic speculation at the 
expense of the messy ideological, historical and social entanglements of objects and 
concepts, is less a failure of methodological judiciousness and explanatory clarity, 
than a familiar post-dialectic collapse of the critique of dogmatic metaphysics into an 
abstract rationalism, that it shares with speculative realism. So, the idea that we can 
subjectivize Laruelle or Laruelle’s anti-decisionist non-philosopher, as a ‘strong poet’ 
figure, conflicts with the scientific reassertion of the object here. There is, in fact, no 
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subject at stake in Laruelle’s non-philosophy.
20
 Indeed, both Laruelle and speculative 
realism represent forms of rationalism that depose idealism in the name of a new 
thinking of the object (a thinking of the object irreducible to the subject). In this light, 
mathematicized science and theoretical speculation, in their immanent analysis of the 
object ‘in-itself’ become the privileged means by which the thinker exposes the false 
or weak abstractions (ideological thinking) and their forms of intellectual support in 
the consensual intersubjectivity of the philosophical cogito. In crucial sense, then, the 
enemy is not exactly appearances, but the interpretation of, or metaphysical projection 
into, appearances, in an echo of the classic post-Kantian and post-Hegelian post-
subject ‘scientism’ of Rudolf Carnap.
21
 If Laruelle calls this the outcome of the 
philosophical cogito decisionism, Quentin Meillassoux calls it correlationism and the 
“becoming-religious of thought,” or the “religionizing of reason.” 
22
 Indeed, this link 
between the idea of correlationism/decisionism and religious thought is fundamental 
to this return to the object. Thought of the object in-itself offers a resistance to the 
object as a metaphysical or even dogmatic metaphysical prop for spiritual values, 
‘language games’, or various forms of historical probabilism. For Meillassoux, this 
requires a fundamental temporalization of the object. As he argues in Against Finitude 
(2008): philosophy’s task against this current becoming-truth of belief (fideism, or 
faith independent of reason) is in the re-ontologization of the scope of mathematics as 
an absolutization of contingency (that is, the only convincing and non-circular way of 
exposing dogmatic metaphysics – of avoiding a clash of incommensurable secular and 
non-secular faiths - is absolutizing the contingency of the given in general [and as 
such all laws in nature and society]): “critical potency is not necessarily on the side of 
those who would undermine the validity of absolute truths, but rather on the side of 
those who would succeed in criticizing both ideological dogmatism and sceptical 
fanaticism. Against dogmatism, it is important that we uphold the refusal of every 
metaphysical absolute, but against the reasoned violence of various fantaticisms, it is 
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important that we re-discover in thought a modicum of absoluteness…”
23
 (the 
absoluteness of contingency). Things may have primary qualities and essences, but 
these primary qualities and essences can be at some future point other than they are. 
Thus, insofar as mathematical science tells us that necessity cannot be derived from 
appearances (of inductively arriving at lawfulness through appearances), the 
absolutization of contingency thereby, allows us to think the non-necessity of 
necessity. For Laruelle, similarly, the “authentically scientific”
24
 critique of 
metaphysics is the problem of philosophical syntax: the ontologization of difference 
(contingency, heterogeneity) in post-Kantian philosophy, far from freeing philosophy 
from metaphysics produces a new metaphysical move: the ‘coupling’ and mutual 
constitution of differences. That is, philosophies of difference are merely localized 
redistributions of essences. The decisionist ‘vanity’ of post-Kantian philosophy, 
therefore, lies in its inability or unwillingness, to “acquire a scientific, non-aporetic 
knowledge” of itself,
25
 in which critique in philosophy “would no longer be a 
complement, a rectification, a deconstruction, a supplement.” 
26
 Central to the failure 
to achieve this end is the abandonment the real as non-reflexive reality, or what 
Laruelle calls the One (an undecidable externality), for “infinite metaphysical games 
of language.”
27
 The One, in other words, is a kind of cognate of a transcendental 
extra-discursive real (although this is not be confused with matter as such, in a kind of 
positivistic sense). “The in-itself and non-reflexive One is distinguished from the 
regions of the emprirical and ideality by a pure transcendental distinction that is 
immediately a ‘real’ distinction…the real no longer designating the ontic but rather 
[a] sphere of non-reflexive immanence. Transcendental distinction is here grounded 
‘in the nature of the thing’…”
28
 In this respect, Meillassoux and Laruelle share a 
certain objectivist, de-subjectivising spirit: the adaptation of science as a would-be 
enlargement of philosophical judgement outside of the vicissitudes of a, critical-
critical, and aporetic thought of the object - a leap beyond finitude we might say. But 
the cost of this post-Kantian rejection of the limits of being-thought and the critique 
of induction is the content of abstraction itself. Abstraction, in Laruelle and 
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speculative realism is made incompatible with praxis and with contradiction, a move 
in the end that only returns philosophy – and philosophy in cultural theory - to a 
version of pre-Hegelian materialism. This turns crucially on their understanding of the 
critique of Sufficient Reason.  
 
Because there is no such thing as Sufficient Reason for Laruelle and Meillassoux  - 
because they reject that things have good reason to be as they are than otherwise - it 
makes it impossible to infer that one state of affairs or event is more probable or 
feasible than an other. This obviously creates a chronic ontological instability or 
insecurity, certainly in Meillassoux; as Frank Ruda argues: “the only sufficient reason 
for things to be how they are is that there is no sufficient reason for them to be how 
they are at all.”
29
 Now of course, this is precisely what drives this rationalist 
materialism’s non-circular claims to post-metaphysical liberation beyond Kant’s 
would-be correlationism: yes, the absolutization of contingency is frightening and 
destablizing, but this is an infinitely productive move, because it allows massive 
scope, as Laruelle insists – and as we have noted - for “unlimited theoretical” 
possibilities as a result of the unlocking of thought from the givenness of objects. That 
things can be other than they are means that philosophy loses its fear of the object, 
insofar as thinking is no longer forced to subject itself to the causal trajectories, 
pregiven histories and ontic intricacies and stabilities of its objects (as in Laruelle’s 
dogmatic rejection of photography’s representational, social-relational intimacy with 
World, City and History). Undoubtedly, the critique of Sufficient Reason is 
fundamental to the critique of any naïve realism or historicism; objects in themselves 
are not foundational for the natural sciences or social sciences and the present is not 
the pregiven outcome of the past. This is something that all post-Spinozan materialist 
philosophies (including Hegel) share with speculative realism. But the absolutizing of 
contingency here as a de-subjectivizing of the philosophical cogito commits an 
unforgiving solecism in its loss of fear of the object: if everything is contingent, 
theories, social objects, natural kinds, then something might not be contingent; if 
everything is possible, then something might not be possible, that is, the possibility of 
‘everything is possible’ might include the possibility that ‘everything is not possible’. 
There is always a possibility of non-possibility, always a possibility of non-
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contingency. Thus in presupposing, therefore, that the non-necessity of necessity is 
the answer to dogmatic metaphysics, rationalist materialism of this stripe, is guilty as 
Ruda says: of a “non-dialectical generalization of un-totalizability.”
30
 In other words, 
once contingency becomes the name for necessity and therefore precedes existence, 
the absolutization of contingency becomes a metaphysical and abstract notion itself, 
destructive of the continuity necessary for thought and practice and scientific 
enquiry
31
 (although Meillassoux, in a strange qualification of his position says, the 
absolutization of contingency only entails laws that could change invisibly from one 
moment to the next).
32
  As Ruda explains: “Contingency can only be logically 
anterior to any existence if there already is existence. Contingency is the retroactive 
anteriority to any existence because there is existence (thus it is not contingency that 
generates existence, but existence that generates insight into the very anteriority of 
contingency and hence already determines contingency”). 
33
  As such, as Hegel, 
insists, in his confrontation with Spinoza’s own rationalist, secular critique of 
necessity and Sufficient Reason, the necessity of contingency is itself contingent. 
34
Not all is contingent. Or rather, the only necessity is not necessarily that of 
contingency. 
 
The political, and philosophical and scientific consequences, which emerge from the 
absolute necessity of contingency, then, are deeply unappealing: as in Gnosticism, 
‘everything is possible’ is uncoupled from the mediations between contingency, 
conceptualization and the real. That is, if science speaks about the mind-independent 
world, this does not mean that matter guarantees materialism or the real for science, 
as if the truth of things is secured by the physicalist appropriation of a mind-
independent nature. The real, rather, is produced at a conceptual level, out of this 
encounter with matter and the object, in so far as science works to produce the real 
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through this process. The conceptualizations of science, therefore, do not simply 
mediate the real of a mind-independent world they actively produce the real not as 
idea, but as a space for further enquiry into, and transformation of, the real. This is 
why the discursive-real/real antipode of speculative realism, is deeply compromised 
as a philosophical model of how science actually works in the world, given 
speculative realism’s reliance on a commonplace or naïve realist view of scientific 
practice perpetrated by many scientists: concepts explain the world, which are then 
confirmed by empirical facts. Contrary, however, to the positing of the truth of 
externality to the untruth of internality, science opens up a space in which scientific 
discourse has actual “real consequences,” as Alenka Zupancic puts it. As she, argues: 
“The fact that the discourse of science creates, opens up a space in which [scientific] 
discourse has (real) consequences also means that it can produce something that not 
only becomes a part of reality, but that can also change it.” 
35
 “Modern science 
literally creates a new real(ity); it is not that the object of science is mediated by its 
formulas, it is indistinguishable from them; it does not exist outside of them, yet it is 
real.”
36
 Science returns to the real; and therefore effectively the conventionalist 
argument about the real being an effect of discourse - which drives the critique of 
correlationalism in speculative realism - is functionally misconceived. In other words, 
the conceptual productions of science do not subjectivize the world – and as such 
produce it as discourse and philosophical speculation - they are the answering call to 
the real that the conceptualization of the real necessarily demands. Consequently if 
science as a matter of self-definition requires a critique of Sufficient Reason, (in order 
to wrest science away from finding teleological or spiritual meaning in matter), it 
doesn’t need the absolutization of contingency in order to achieve this. For, the 
outcome, paradoxically of the absolutization of contingency as a scientistic move 
within philosophy, is the anti-scientistic demotion of the real as a non-contingent 
demand on the conceptualization of real. Once contingency is absolutized as a critique 
of dogmatic metaphysics, all causation becomes suspect as way of explaining 
necessity. Because causation is unable to conform to any law-giving arrangements in 
the long run, the time of causation is rendered irreal. Hence the major outcome of the 
absolute release of contingency, of the liberation of the object from necessity, is that it 
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leaves everything as it is, because if there is no reason why things are the way they 
(within either a given mortal or cosmological time frame), then objects and their 
relations lose all traction as things that may change or necessarily resist change, or 
conversely may necessarily require change because they resist change. Thus on this 
account, inferring change, on the basis of a probabilistic account of a given set of 
tendencies, is ruled out of court from the beginning. This is because, such 
probabilistic tendencies are themselves held to be contingent or arbitrary under all 
conditions. One can see, then, why, the rational materialism of speculative realism has 
a certain scientistic and secular appeal at the moment, under the pressure of what we 
might call the Zizekian-type pincer movement of contemporary liberal fideism and 
fundamentalist dogmatism. 
 
The neo-liberal rationalization and tolerance of stupidity and ignorance as ‘personal 
belief’, and the justification of ‘revealed truth’ as ‘spiritual flourishing’ in various 
religious fundamentalisms, spreads the dogmatic subjectivization of thought into 
every nook and cranny of capitalist life, producing, as a counter to this, a tempting 
scientistic reaction or point of objectivist intolerance, inside contemporary 
philosophy, in its critique of both subjectivism and positivism. Against Finitude and 
Laruelle’s speculative scientism, thus, have a certain family resemble to the post-
ideological invective of Richard Dawkins
37
: a plague on all your ideological plagues. 
True emancipation, on their watch, lies in protecting science from the discursive cage 
of theory and embracing truth in philosophy as a knowledge of the ‘great Outside,’ as 
a big, bold clear out of the contemporary “religionizing” of thought – or, in different 
register, doing to death the death of the death of God. But back on earth, in the day-
to-day workings of ideology and practice, objects are not simply contingent essences 
that need liberating from the subjectivist grip of correlationism or decisionism (in 
order to resist the lures of fideism), but contradictory sites of subject-object 
mediation. This means that the ‘object-liberation movement’ of the new rationalist 
materialism fails (or more precisely rejects) a principle test of the dialectical tradition: 
the unity of appearance and reality. In this tradition there are no mere appearances or 
mere illusions; appearances and illusions are a product of the movement of the real 
itself. And therefore all appearances and illusions contain some measure of truth; that 
                                                        
37
 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, Bantam Press, London, 2006 
is appearances and illusions reveal as much as they conceal the reality that is manifest 
in them.
38
 If conceptualization answers the real, then, it answers it on these terms: 
thought and praxis as immanent to illusion. This requires a subject who-is-not-a-
subject,
39
 who is transcendentally constituted not through the neutral access to the 
object-in-itself, but through the vicissitudes of struggle and failure. This means in turn 
a fundamental re-correlation of subject and object.  As Slavoj Zizek argues: “we 
cannot gain full neutral access to reality because we are part of it. The 
epistemological distortion of our access to reality is the result of our inclusion in it, 
not of our distance from it…the very epistemological failure (to reach reality) is an 
indication and effect of our being part of reality, of our inclusion within it.”
40
 The 
absolutization of contingency breaks this dialectical link, in its non-dialectical 
totalization of things, by treating all appearances as subjective illusions. As a result, 
what Marx calls the  “relative necessity” of appearances (the explanatory link 
between appearances and objective/subjective ‘real possibilities’ in the world) is 
made incomprehensible.
41
 This is why conceptualization as the theorization of 
appearances, is an answer to the immanent transformation of the real, and not simply, 
the means by which appearances ‘lack of reason’ are exposed.    
 
Laruelle’s concept of non-photography (and non-philosophy) is particularly guilty 
here of this anti-dialectical flattening of appearance and the real - if one can actually 
assign culpability to a system that doesn’t see the real as a philosophical problem at 
all in these terms, and therefore, has no sense of the relationship between appearances 
and knowledge, indeed, refuses it out of hand: the object of philosophy is not the 
conceptualization of the real as a delimited manifestation of the real, of an 
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intervention into the real, but the “specularization of real objects”.
42
 In other words, 
given that for Laruelle the photographic image is an image-thing, rather an image of 
the thing, appearances have no constitutive relationship to truths that possibly stand 
‘behind them’ inferentially. Photographs harbour “nothing invisible.” 
43
 In other 
words appearances have no immanent relationship to the real. This is why his abstract 
photo-theory, wants nothing to do with photography’s would-be relational, conceptual 
claims on its real objects (the World, History, the City): “Far from giving back 
perception, history or actuality, etc, in a weakened form”, 
44
 photography reveals an 
“immanent chaos”
45
 that is derived directly from the gap between the image-thing and 
the image of the thing.  Because, as Laruelle declares, a photograph is a semblance 
that resembles nothing – a flat identity in the last instance - there is no requirement on 
the part of an abstract theory of photography for thought in fact to be ‘accountable’ to 
appearances, indeed, for theory to be accountable to appearances is to undermine the 
very possibility of speculative thought itself. “A photo is more than a window or an 
opening, it is an infinite open, an unlimited universe from vision to the pure state.”
46
 
Photographs are, on the contrary, algorithms – transitional states - not schemas, he 
says, and as such, opposed to every philosophical synthesis that would hierarchize 
their contents based on a notion of inferential truth. Consequently, photographic 
appearances do not disclose abstractions (social division, spatial relations, the 
unconscious), they are themselves abstractions, that is, manifestations of photography 
as a field of infinite materialities. And Laruelle calls this algorithmic potential 
photography’s essential fractality (that is, its immanent resistance to philosophical 
synthesis as a condition of the gap between image-thing and image-as-thing, and not 
evidence of the photograph’s hidden geometric relations, in the manner of chaos 
theory). Fractality, then, is the intensive excess derived from photography’s 
irreducibility to representation that photography instantiates and calls for from an 
abstract theory of photography. As such, in his later refinement of this theory in 
Photo-Fiction, a Non-Standard Aesthetics (2012), fractality becomes more precisely, 
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the “onto-vectorial” and “quantic” aspect of the photograph
47
 “liberating possibilities 
of new virtualities.”
48
 He calls, this process more broadly, photo-fiction or thought-
art, in which the “photo is now the end of realism via an excess of the real and the 
absence of reality.”
49
 Indeed, the photographer ‘loses’ his causal and historico-
conceptual relation to the world, in exchange for an art of “interweaving 
disciplines.”
50
 The quantic and the onto-vectorial, consequently, are forged by, and 
folded into, the “impossibilities of representation.”
51
 This in turn provides the 
jumping off point for a philosophy (non-philosophy) that builds off the absolute 
fiction of the photograph, without description or metaphor. Such descriptive and 
metaphoric moves are simply photo-centric (that is decisionist). As such, the meaning 
of the photograph cannot be produced historically or dialectically, only quantically, 
through the immanent operations of photo-fiction itself. In such photo-fictions and 
their interpretations the conceptual image remains an “objective appearance”
52
 and, 
therefore, denies the world-determining and realist relation of standard photography 
and critical-theoretic or genealogical-historical criticism. In these terms, abstraction as 
a non-consistent multiplicity here, is a version of the absolutization of contingency at 
the level of perception, and returns us to all the problems of the post-dialectical 
tradition, that besets this rationalist materialism and speculative realism.  
 
Photographs clearly are not simply windows on the world or fictive symbols, they are 
indeed abstractions as Laruelle correctly insists, but they are abstractions not simply 
because they constitute in their theoretical reception a “transcendental creative 
force”
53
 or refuse the “complacencies of recognition”,
54
 and “perceptual normality”
55
, 
but because they are the outcome of, and instate, a specific set of social 
determinations. In this sense, photographs are properly concrete abstractions (socially 
embedded signs) that are also real abstractions (that is subject to and are the product 
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of conflicting processes of social and technological reproduction and commodity 
exchange that operate transindividually behind the backs of producers and spectators 
alike).
56
 And this is why the appearances of photography, therefore, are not ‘pure 
phenomena’ waiting for unlimited quantic speculation, but the objective 
concretization of these processes of abstraction and as such recoverable in theory. 
Photography, then, is both a process of (real) abstraction and a system of appearance-
generating mechanisms by which social abstractions are produced as signs as the 
outcome of this objective process. Consequently, the appearances of photography are 
caught up in the conflicts and contradictions of these processes as the source of 
photography’s (abstract) truth-claims.  
 
Thus, at one level, Laruelle, in the spirit of the critique of Sufficient Reason, is right 
(indeed he calls his theoretical move a critique of the Principle of Sufficient 
Photography). We need a theory of abstraction in photography and not as a formal 
afterthought or critical addendum; photographs are always more than their given or 
assumed appearances. This is in order to tell us that photographs are not mere things, 
not mere appearances, not mere illusory symbols, but (conflictual) ideological 
entities, that, in their very fallen and fractured ideological condition, open out onto the 
world. Consequently, we also need a theory of abstraction that resists the received 
categories and generic assumptions of naïve realism; a theory of abstraction, that is, as 
Laruelle puts it, resistant to false or pregiven syntheses and historicist closures. 
Laruelle, is right to insist, therefore, as abstractions photographs demand an active 
theoretical engagement. What we don’t require, however, is a theory of abstraction in 
which a version of the absolutization of contingency dismantles the link between 
appearances and truth telling as the necessary precondition of abstraction as 
speculation (“photography is a representation that neither reasons nor reflects”).
57
 
This is a wholly underdetermined account of photography, in which the inferential 
powers of abstraction – of photographic appearance as conceptually contentful in a  
determinate fashion - are weakened, diminishing the place of the photograph in a 
                                                        
56
 For a discussion of the transindividual function of real abstraction, see Alfred Sohn-
Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology, Macmillan, 
London, 1978 
57
 Laruelle, ibid, p37 
socially discursive account of representation as a “giving and asking for reasons.”
58
 In 
reifying singularity – in Laruelle’s language, fractality – therefore, the truth-
producing aporias and conflicts of photography disappear into mere abstraction, into 
the indeterminate and non-dialectical abstractedness of photography as a non-
consistent multiplicity; a theory of abstraction without abstraction, so to speak, 
without relation and the real. In the final analysis, then, this turns on the deep-lying 
character of the science-world relation as part of a dialectical account of 
representation and the image. The emergence of the modern and the transformation of 
nature begin when the concepts of science possess the world and the real in all their 
multiplicity in order transform nature and the world and the concepts of science; this 
is truly emancipatory. Possession then as form of abstraction is closer to 
Darstellungmethode, in Marx’s sense,
59
 than it is to Vertretung, that is closer to 
representation as active depiction, as staged production, than representation as ‘acting 
for’, as representative of; as replication, copying. Abstraction is not simply a matter of 
epistemology (of reflection) - of the conceptualization of sensuous particulars - but, 
rather, an act of world building. That is, the work of abstraction already begins from 
the process of abstraction, from the concrete-as-abstraction.
60
 Nevertheless, it is 
Vertretung that is invariably identified with abstraction as a process of 
conceptualization, and therefore with the notion that abstraction is presupposed by an 
instrumentalizing and self-distancing relation to the world.  Conceptualization as a 
reflexive and active production and possession of the real (as an answering response 
to the demands of the real as not-all), so crucial to the practice of abstraction in 
Darstellungmethode is forgotten. Yet, it is precisely abstraction in these terms that is 
able to think the relationship between appearances and the demands of the real, 
discursiveness and the extra-discursive, as a condition of transformative practice. For 
it is precisely abstraction as Darstellungmethode, as the dialectical possession of 
appearances, and therefore, of the production of the real as the conceptualization of 
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the ‘not all’, that creates a “new space of the real.”
61
  The real is not an essence or 
substance to be ‘found’ discursively or extra-discursively, it is a limit-condition to be 
defined. Laruelle and speculative realism, however, in their respective versions of 
‘world building’ as abstraction offer a version of Darstellungmethode without this 
necessary torsion. Indeed, they want abstraction without the real of the ‘not-all’, 
without determinate ‘limits’, and therefore without a subject who is part of this 
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